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Algaze, Guillermo. Initial Social Complexity in Southwestern Asia, The Mesopotamian Advantage. Current Anthropology 2001 Vol. 42(2):199-234. Guillermo Algaze uses this paper to explain why some of the earliest
urbanized societies became prevalent in the alluvial lowlands of the
Tigris and Algaze uses the work of urban expert, Jane Jacobs, to attempt to explain the social development of these societies in the late 5th and 4th millennia B.C. She believes that human economies share many characteristics with biological ecosystems. Algaze presents the similarities between them. The first is that the stability of the two depended on having a large degree of diversity. Algaze uses this model when explaining the large amount of diversity displayed by these societies in the agriculture sector. They were farmers of many kinds of products and raised domesticated animals for meat and wool production. Second, the expansion of economies and biological ecosystems depended heavily on the capturing and using external energy. And third, development of the society took place within a scheme of smaller co-developments. These co-developments were as numerous and diverse as the society. Algaze uses the models presented by Jacobs to explain many developments within the Mesopotamian societies. The developments of diverse agriculture products, trade networks and a large, skilled, and diverse work force all fit into the schemes presented by Jacobs. Algaze also touches on the differing development between the southern polities of the Mesopotamian region and the central and northern societies. This stemmed from the southern region's access to skilled labor, craft specialists, soldiers, and potential colonists. Increased access was due to the Southern region’s lower population and therefore greater land density for immigrants. This immigration influx spurred the overall development of the southern culture. Many of the comments revolve around the quality of the research and the systematic way that Algaze presented and collected his data, and others commend him on writing an essay that is successful at combining many aspects of archaeology, such as environment, social parameters, and scientific evidence. Much of the criticism for his research revolves around utilizing Jane Jacobs’ model, and questions whether an economic system can truly expand in a fashion similar to a biological system. Overall, it seems people accept and agree with his findings, but question the validity of some of his outside models. CLARITY: 4
Algaze, Guillermo. Initial Social Complexity in This article looks at the reason that Most of the comments on this article are positive. A
few issues are brought up about his article. One is that Algaze doesn’t look at
the ideologies that gave meaning to the natural and social environment
that he is looking at. Another issue that is raised is Algaze’s
idea that the individuals in CLARITY: 2
Callegari-Jacques, S. et al. Demography And Genetics at the Tribal Level: The Xavante as a Test Case. Current Anthropology. February, 2001 Vol. 42(1):154-161. The overall concern of the article was developing a statistical way to study tribal dynamics and characterize the shift from tribal to non-tribal living as reflected in genetics. The study centered on Brazilian indigenous groups that had been well studied since the early 20th century. The goal was to compare the demographic data obtained from genetic testing with the demographic data obtained by anthropologists through life histories. The study focused on three indigenous tribes: the Yanomama, Merkranoti, and Ache. Researchers were looking to compare/contrast the three tribes on criterion such as life expectancy, male fertility, female fertility, reproductive fitness, and phenotypes. Callegari-Jacques et al. argue that more studies should utilize intergeneration correlations between fertility and mortality in order to study population dynamics among communities. There are few studies that use a combination of genetic markers and anthropologic data. However, Callegari-Jacques et al. argue the need for integration between demography, cultural anthropologists and geneticists when it comes to the study of populations. This paper’s intent is to serve as a model for future research and experimental design which combines life history theory and genetic approaches. The argument was constructed using a scientific approach. The methods of data collection were outlined and discussed in the context of other literature. Next the authors have a results section in which they present the statistical correlations and plots obtained from the indigenous populations. The statistics used are very involved and require some background in statistics in order to fully understand what the data is saying. The discussion and conclusions helped to sum up the results but without firm statistical knowledge there is no way to verify if the data supports the conclusions. For this reason, the overall clarity ranking is low. An undergraduate with limited statistical experience would have a difficult time understanding the material in this paper. However, given guidance this article would prove useful in experimental design and statistical analysis. The evidence presented in the article is mostly mathematical and fails to integrate the cultural aspect of fertility and mortality. However, as a pilot study, this may serve as a basis for cultural study given that it sets out such population dynamics as average life expectancy and reproductive rates. The information gained by the statistical analysis of genetics in the communities can add to the overall understanding of a population. CLARITY RANKING: 3
Callaghan, Richard T. Ceramic Age Seafaring and Interaction
Potential in the This article, by Richard T. Callaghan, uses computer
simulations to examine ancient South American people’s ability
to navigate and explore the sea. The study focuses on the islands of
the Antilles off
the coast of The study concludes that chance discovery, through drifting, would have
been unlikely and dangerous. Unintentional drifting would take long amounts
of time and risk the death of many voyagers. Never the less, Callaghan
believes chance discovery could have occurred. This chance discovery
would have led the Saladoids to discover the CLARITY RANKING: 3 W.
Coronil, Fernando, Alan G. Fix, Peter Pels, Charles
L. Briggs, Raymond Hames, Susan Lindee, and Alcida Rita Ramos. Perspectives
on
Tierney’s Darkness in This article consists of a series of critiques of Patrick
Tierney’s
Darkness in Tierney alludes to Neel’s supposed inclination towards eugenics and Chagnon’s insistence on the Yanomami as “fierce people,” asserting that social devastation and unethical treatment of the people were intended by the two scientists. Alan Fix concludes that Tierney believes the “Yanomami [have] suffered great harm as a result of scientific research.” A criticism made by all authors is Tierney’s inconsistency in his data, specifically material relating to the measles epidemic of 1967, which unquestionably could not have been spread by Chagnon and Neel as Tierney suggests. Tierney also lacks proper documentation and references to support such claims as well as acceptable ethnographic accounts. Many of his claims require support, and oftentimes were established in presumptions and the misreading of information. Lindee asserts “reading it [the book] is like watching someone self-destruct for a good cause. Tierney is a flaming Buddhist monk. One cannot quite turn away.” The assumed central theme of the book, the health and status of the
Yanomami, is secondary to the work of Chagnon and Neel. Tierney is quick
to blame global economic conditions created by the Ministry of Health
and Social Development, yet ignores the role of the World Bank, International
Monetary Fund, and Despite heavy criticism by the authors, many of them praised Tierney for raising important issues regarding methodology and ethics in anthropology. The politics of knowledge and how one acquires knowledge are two main concerns for future anthropologists. As Tierney picked and chose his evidence against Chagnon and Neel, anthropologists must be warned against doing the same. Human rights must be maintained throughout all scientific studies, which was overlooked in Chagnon’s blood samples, cinematic exploits, and records of the names of the dead. In short, the authors argue that Tierney’s book is lacking in sufficient documentation and an objective viewpoint to convince an educated reader of the “facts” surrounding the influence of Western scientists. His prejudices slant the information about Chagnon and Neel, while detracting from the true issue of the Yanomami. If Tierney were truly concerned about the health and social conditions of the Yanomami, he would have abandoned anthropological politics and focused on the aftermath and reality of Yanomami lives. Important ethical points were made, yet masked in underlying prejudices towards Chagnon and Neel. CLARITY RANKING: 4
Douglas, Bronwen. From Invisible Christians to Gothic Theatre. Current Anthropology 2001 Vol. 42(5):615-650. “From Invisible Christians to Gothic Theatre” looks
at how Christianity in Melanesia has been documented by anthropologists
through
history and criticizes much of the ethnographical work that was done
in CLARITY: 3
Samuel Fernandex-Carriba and Angela Loeches. Fruit Smearing by Captive Chimpanzees: A Newly Observed Food-Processing Behavior. Current Anthropology Feb, 2001 Vol 43(1):143-150. Fernandez-Carriba and Loeches begin their article expressing the need for research on primates in order to draw new conclusions about the evolutionary stages of humans. Because chimpanzees are genetically the most similar primate to humans, understanding chimpanzees may aid in the understanding human evolution. Recent research has challenged the notion that a cultural uniqueness is specific to humans by discovering 39 new behaviors in the natural habitats of wild chimpanzees. Fifteen of these behavioral patters involve food processing. Contrary to the notion that animals eat their food as it comes instead of transforming it in some way like humans, the behavior of the chimpanzees suggests that primates may process their food too. Although captivity may influence behavior, Fernandez-Carriba and Loeches’s study describes a new behavior observed by chimpanzees captive in the Madrid Zoo that is different from all other observed behaviors. Fernandez-Carriba and Loeches observed a group of ten chimpanzees, eight of which were born in the wild. The chimpanzees were enclosed in a 200 square meter outdoor area and fed a variety of fruits and vegetables including apples, bananas, carrots, and oranges twice daily. Observations were made three times a week and with video cameras. The processing behavior was first observed by Linda, one of two adult females who had most of her teeth removed a few months before the study. Linda took a piece of fruit and hit it against a shape edge and smeared the food against a rough surface of the wall. She then proceeded to lick the fruit and juice off of the wall and ate the remaining fruit. Soon most of the other chimpanzees imitated Linda; however, there were a few who have not shown any signs of the behavior. Additionally, most of the chimpanzees that imitated Linda’s behavior used their right hand for the processing, although one showed equal use of both hands. Fernandez-Carriba and Loeches conclude that it was unlikely that Linda learned this behavior given her age at the time of entry to the zoo and limited time spent in the wild. Moreover, they acknowledge that the behavior spread throughout the group and was passed on through two generations. Although Linda’s missing dentition suggests that the behavior was originally functional, its imitation suggests that there may have been other reasons for chimpanzees to partake in food processing. The authors propose that chimpanzees may find the smearing of food an appealing way to eat. They conclude that the behavior must be imitation of Linda because the probability that all of the chimpanzees were learning by trial and error is very slim. The authors summarize their article by stating that their data is an important contribution to research in behavioral and cultural characteristics of primates. They emphasize that their findings on right-handed preference is also significant. Overall their article provides new insight to the general study primates and their relation to human evolution. CLARITY: 5
Finkler, Kaja. The Kin in the Gene: The Medicalization of Family and Kinship in American Society. Current Anthropology 2001 Vol. 42 (2): 235-263. Kaja Finkler’s article addresses the impacts that
medicalization has on individuals and their ideas of family within
the modern Finkler does an excellent job providing examples of how medicalization has changed people’s lives. She uses examples from her own research involving women with either breast cancer or a family history of the disease, and a number of adoptees who had been searching for their parents. By using personal narrative from her consultants, Finkler defends the thesis of her paper. Genetics and family history is becoming important not only to individuals,
but to corporations such as medical insurance companies. The importance
of family medical history is also reflected in a recent law enacted in Through the discovery and acceptance of genetics, individuals are forced to begin including both distant and future relatives in their personal definition of kin and who your kin. Finkler states that “the medicalization of family and kinship forces us to establish a connectedness with kin in the wake of the weakening of family ties, whether we choose to or not.” Finkler also points out that by placing emphasis on genetics, the question of “Why me?”, which is asked in times of medical despair can be answered. Finkler’s most compelling quote that sums up, in my opinion, the entire article is that “the ideology of genetic inheritance promises contemporary humans immortality within the flux of the postmodern world.” The author’s reply following peer comments is thoughtful and detailed. She first answers each of the comments, and then defends her belief that although breast cancer is no more socially constructed than any other disease, the activities that occur due to the fear of breast cancer are socially constructed. She also concedes that although victims of specific disease may be genetically predetermined, their actions are socially constructed. CLARITY RANKING: 4 JESSICA NELSON-SELLERS University of Idaho (Laura Putsche)
Finkler, Kaja. The Kin in the Gene: The Medicalization of Family and Kinship in American Society. Current Anthropology April, 2001 Vol.42(2):235-263. This article is looking at the new surge in genetic research that has hit biomedicine. Kaja Finkler believes that genetics has caused kinship to be medicalized. This has changed the individual’s ideas about family and kinship. To look at this issue the article begins with an overview of the Anthropological research that surrounds kinship. The article then takes a brief look at the ideas about family and kinship in contemporary American society. The article then looks at medicalization in general before looking at the medicalization of kinship and its consequences. Kaja Finkler uses evidence from medicine, television, newspapers, and magazines to show how talking about kinship has changed. She then looks at what the change in how we talk about kinship means about the change in how we think about kinship. The article then looks at how these changes are experienced by individuals on a personal level. Evidence included in this section is from a study that Kaja Finkler did. The study is based on interviews of 35 women who had had breast cancer or were from families with a history of breast cancer and 15 individuals who were adopted and looking for their birth parents. During this section she gives quotes and ideas that she gathered from her study to support her claim that genetics has changed the way we look at kinship. In the last section Kaja Finkler looks at the consequences that the medicalization of kinship has. The comments on Finkler’s article were mostly positive. The commentators mainly added other thought to ideas that Finkler began in her article. Hugh Gusterson reviews some of the ideas of Finkler’s that he appreciated and then gives one criticism. He doesn’t like the use of the word ‘medicalization’ because it is not adequate to describe the situation. He suggest using the word ‘geneticization. Nortin M. Hadler and James p. Evans try to use a brief commentary to prove Finkler’s argument flawed. Overall the commentators are happy with the overall idea and think that further research needs to be done. In her reply, Finkler addresses the commentators on there individual issues and is largely appreciative of the insight that they have brought to the article. CLARITY: 4
Gil-White, Francisco J. Are Ethnic Groups Biological “Species” to the Human Brain? Essentialism in Our Cognition of Some Social Categories. Current Anthropology 2001 Vol. 42 (4):515-554. Gil-White looks at how the human brain categorizes ethnie, ethnic group(s), in an attempt to show that, though they are not biological species, the human brain is so constituted that it categorizes them as species, or natural kinds. He attempts to clear up any misunderstanding of his point right at the beginning by telling the reader that ethnies are not biologically different, and that he is only discussing how our mind conceives of the categories. His many examples, such as the ugly duckling, Nazis’ view of the Jews, and the Mongolians, help to elucidate his point that the human mind does consider ethnies and natural kinds as the same type of categorization. In the Mongolian example, he claims that Mongolians believe that even if a Mongolian child is taken from birth and raised by another group, it will still grow into a Mongolian. In the Ugly Duckling example, he shows that no matter what the ducks do, they cannot turn the hatchling into anything but a swan. In the Nazi example he states that the Nazis would discriminate against Jewish descendents even to 1/8th status. These examples show that the basic view of common people is that a person’s cultural tradition is essential to his or her bloodline, and so cannot be changed even when raised in a different culture. Gil-White’s argument relies on basic presuppositions that are held, he claims, by most, if not all, pre-modern and modern societies. One presupposition is that those from a different cultural group are inherently different, or “essentially” different. Gil-White builds on this idea by explaining why the human brain has evolved in this way. The human animal has attempted to make social interactions easier, and by everyone playing the same game they can play much longer and much more easily. Knowing that different ethnies did not play the same game by the same rules allowed humans to make general decisions or guess about out-group behavior that was “inexpensive” and easy to understand. Thinking of a different ethnie as a different species helped the explanation and understanding of different priorities, hence they could work or trade with other groups without incurring the cost of miscoordination. Gil-White’s reply to most critics is that they have missed the point. He fully takes the blame onto himself and claims that he did not explain his position well enough. It seems, though, that he did explain his position well enough, but the presuppositions held by the critics blocked their ability to fully hear what Gil-White was attempting to say. Both Rothbart and Taylor attempt to disagree with the article, but everything they put forward appears to support what Gil-White claims. He does make a significant statement in reply to Astuti, by agreeing that further cross-cultural studies are needed to prove or disprove his hypothesis because he only really utilized a study of Mongolians. CLARITY RANKING: 4
Hawkes, Kristen, J. F. O’Connell, and N. G. Blurton Jones. Hunting and Nuclear Families: Some Lessons from the Hadza about Men’s Work. Current Anthropology 2001 Vol. 42(5):681-709. The authors are concerned with a problem regarding meat sharing among hunters and gatherers, which is that families of more successful hunters, and particularly the children of these families, have been found to have better nutrition. Many have concluded that this is because these men bring more meat into the home than other men of the same group. This hypothesis is questioned, and the authors cite evidence that among many hunting and gathering societies, and particularly among the Hadza, the meat resources are divided equally among the entire group. The article looks at many other possibilities as to how, then, the children of more successful hunters have better nutrition. These other hypotheses include looking at the possibility that the husband/father of the family is also a better forager of other goods, such as plants or honey. However, these seem to not correlate with the data. Instead, the data point to some correlation between successful hunters and wives who are more successful at providing nutrients through gathering higher yields of plants. The article argues that male hunting is driven by competition within the group. While all families receive the same amount of meat, there are other food gathering activities that yield a larger quantity of food. The authors hypothesize that competition among males translates into greater success in marriage for more successful hunters. The authors look to the Ache and Hadza for evidence of this, where they find that more successful hunters have higher fertility rates. Women who are producing more children have husbands who are more successful hunters. These men are also more likely to marry younger women, therefore producing even more children. The research among the Hadza suggests that women are more likely to want to marry better hunters, although the fact that they are better hunters does not mean that the family will have more meat. Hunting success is widely known by the entire group. Through this success, the hunter has greater access to wives who are more successful foragers, and in this way better hunters’ families are better off nutritionally. The authors show through their analysis that Hadza hunting, along with a wide range of hunters and gatherers, is not a paternal activity, but is more of a competitive activity, and is a very important phenomena in terms of evolution. Males who are better hunters establish their achieved status, which has great impact on that hunter’s life. When others see that he is successful, the hunter will have a status that affords him other opportunities, such as wider choice of mates, more successful remarriage, and a larger number of children. He therefore has access to the wives who are the hardest working, and are better at successfully providing for their families. In response to comments on the article, the authors reiterate the importance of big game versus small game. While there were many questions as to the extent to which big game hunting is important, and to what extent it is a competitive activity and not a paternal activity, the authors showed much data in support of their hypothesis that hunting is a competitive activity. They further look at situations of the unsuccessful hunter. They say that since it is almost impossible for a hunter, even a very successful hunter, to bring in large game days in a row, there is plenty opportunity for all hunters, even poor ones, to contribute. They point out that the best hunter in a group is normally unsuccessful. JAMAL
Hawkes, K., J. F. O’Connell, N.G. Blurton Jones. Hunting and Nuclear Families: Some Lessons From the Hadza About Men’s Work. Current Anthropology December, 2001 Vol. 42(5): 681-703. Hawkes, O’Connell, and Jones analyze the foraging strategies of Hadza hunter-gatherers living in the East African Rift. Previous models of foraging strategy and social organization placed great emphasis on a man’s hunting skill as a survival benefit for his family. Research showed that the wives and children of the best hunters are better nourished than the rest of the population. The authors propose that because of food distribution patterns where meat is shared widely, hunters families do not receive their extra nutrition from meat brought home by the father. They suggest instead, that the foraging skills of the mother (and to some extent the children) are responsible for the nutritional success of the hunter’s family. They use this reasoning to counter arguments that men are better hunters to attract women as sexual partners, essentially trading food for sex. They reject this argument as the motivating factor behind mate selection and the development of the nuclear family. The author’s support their argument with time allocation data of food procurement activities over a period of several seasons. They assessed the relative nutritional condition of the camp residents through periodic weighings. They controlled for seasonal variation in daylight vs. nighttime hunting hours, compared males relative hunting success, and measured their foraging effort based on the amount of food brought into camp. They calculated an overall daily average for each hunter and then compared this to data on the distribution of meat. Comparison of their data sets provided several conclusions. While the hunter might contribute a large amount of game to the group, this skill in hunting only marginally increases the nutritional resources of his family. The authors analyzed the changes in children’s weight and found that the children of the best hunters were generally better fed. However, weight changes did not correspond to the father’s seasonal hunting success. Analysis of data on women’s foraging found that women’s foraging time did not change in relation to the men’s hunting success and that children’s weights fluctuated in relation to their mother. They provide five data tables and nine graphs with detailed analysis. In response to this data, the authors attempt to provide several alternate reasons for mate selection and the development of the nuclear family. They suggest that anthropologists look to ornithology studies as well as primate research for mate selection theory, due to the high rates of monogamy among birds. They propose male competition for mates and mate guarding as a possibility for mating choice, and competition among men as the incentive to hunt. Commenters generally looked favorably on the information that Hawkes et. al. brought to the discussion of hunting as paternal investment. However, criticisms of the work included the idea that while men’s hunting success might not directly and immediately affect the health of their families, it favorably affected the distribution of food within the group. If a man had a lean hunting season, his family was still fed. In providing food to the group he was ensuring his family’s welfare in times of need. Other arguments included that weight gain is not an adequate measure of nutritional health, coercion rather than competition might be a social strategy, and that it is not exactly clear what the authors are arguing against. Hawkes, O’Connell and Jones reply to the comments about the hunting hypothesis, humans as two-parent breeding species, importance of non-meat resources, and “the generality of lessons from the Hadza”. They counter that group benefits are not enough to explain individual behavior, women are the key determinant in the success of children, meat is an important dietary component but unreliable, and that the Hadza present one example of foraging strategies. They stress that their work attempts to expand the realm of possibilities and does not claim to be the solution in all hunter-gatherer societies. CLARITY: 3
Inomata, Takeshi. The Power and Ideology of Artistic Creation: Elite Craft Specialists in Classic Maya Society. Current Anthropology 2001 Vol. 42(3):321-350. Inomata proposes that the products of elite artists in Maya society may have been ideologically loaded with privileged knowledge, useful in distinguishing elites from each other, and from non-elites. After reviewing debate about the archaeological theory of craft specialization, he adds to the supporting evidence and examines its possible use in power relations. He says ideology can support a system of domination through its ‘materialization’ and suggests that the very act of creating an art form may be ideological in nature. Advocating the use of the micro and macro scale when examining this theory, Inomata cautions that they should be used specifically; micro in examining producer and action oriented questions, and macro in examining societal analysis. He cites previous research indicating that craft specialization is found in both small-scale societies and in complex societies. Therefore, the theory is problematic when used in an evolutionary context. He warns against assuming the status of individuals based on whether they are independent or attached specialists, because evidence suggests that they may be both, in different contexts. Citing the increasing evidence of craft specialization in Classic Maya society, as it stands in contrast with other complex societies where artists are non-elites, he implies there is a difference in social and political context. Inomata presents past research supporting the use of craft specialization as an alternative method of gaining power for members of a society who would not otherwise be heir to powerful positions. Elites have different types of capital, and he suggests that this difference plays an important role in socio-cultural relations. Not only is skill involved, but also an association with supernatural powers. Specialization involved privileged knowledge in order to encode and decode crafts. This ability is what he calls ‘cultural capital’, and he asserts that meaning can only be fully derived by someone with this knowledge. Like economic capital, cultural and ‘symbolic capital’ (prestige, reputation for taste) are unequally distributed, and symbolic capital can easily convert to political capital. Inomata offers his archaeological research to support this theory. He
reports findings from the Aguateca ( In replies to comments from colleagues, Inomata revisits his definition of terms, clarifying the use of ‘cultural capital’ by stating that it refers to the knowledge required to produce and appreciate a product. He responds to questions posed by Hendon, regarding the gender assigned to elite scribes, saying that females are represented, but that it is unclear the degree to which they controlled production. Responding to debate about ‘high culture’, Inomata emphasizes his position in examining production level of art in addition to exchange theories of power relations with regard to socially constructed meaning. CLARITY RANKING: 3
Inomata, Takeshi. The Power and Ideology of Artistic Creation: Elite Craft Specialists in Classic Maya Society. Current Anthropology June, 2001. Vol.42(3):321-349. Craft specialization in complex societies carries further meaning than simply economic efficiency and accommodation to environmental factors. There are inherent political and social implications of specialized production. Inomata examines these deeper ideological meanings in craft specialization among the elites in Classic Maya Aguateca. He first outlines two types of specialization developed by Earle, Brumfiel, and Costin. Independent specialization is general production with no attention towards demand. It is guided by “principles for efficiency and security.” Attached specialization is production of goods by contract for specific reason, and is a response to the desire and necessity of elites to control certain production. It is in attached specialization on a micro scale, “at the level of individual producers and actions,” that Inomata finds political and ideological implications for Mayan society. Aguateca provides an excellent opportunity to analyze daily activities of the Maya because around A.D. 800 it was attacked and burned, leaving many tools and products in their exact usage contexts. Evidence for elite craft specialists lies in analysis of goods found in 11 structures including Palace Group royal residences and houses of nobles where “artistic production was found in all four excavated subroyal elite residences.” Production is obviously attached specialization because of the frequency in the appearance of scribes’ names on stelae and other goods, such as pottery. Inomata suggests that the combination of political and artistic roles was not the duty of scribes but instead, the political figures may have engaged in craft production for the reason that “artistic production and its products were probably important sources of political power and prestige but not their only source.” Prestige goods carry particular societal implications because of the elites’ sole access to high-status crafts, and the involvement of the elites in production carries further meaning. Gods are frequently displayed painting, carving, and sculpting and the association of elites with the realm of the supernatural emphasizes the divine right to rule. In addition, “skilled crafting can contribute to higher prestige and power in some societies.” Even the knowledge and ability to produce elite goods implies possession of a superior power. Because of the important connotations of superiority and divine right to rule, Inomata suggests that elite craft production was attached production. Comments are praising of Inomata’s efforts and theoretical basis. Costin suggests that the social status of the artisans and the idea of attached production be kept separate because of the differences in social relations that each entails, and Bordieu’s “cultural capital” is helpful in defining valued cultural knowledge. Marcus shows that many of the patterns Inomata found at Aguateca are typical of chiefdoms, in which it is harder to classify the difference between independent and attached production. Inomata responds to Webster’s warning of different abandonment processes with faith in “detailed, innovative analysis.” He is enthusiastic about developing a stronger theory of craft specialization. Speaking on the ideological power of elites he says, “the concept of high culture does not mean that the most sophisticated aesthetics is held exclusively by elites. Without the ability to impress nonelites, high culture would lose much of its political value as a conveyor of dominant ideologies.” CLARITY:5
Kahn, Joel S. Anthropology and Modernity. Current Anthropology 2001 Vol. 42(5):651-680. Joel Kahn looks at the pertinence of modernity theories
to the field of anthropology. He argues that conversation between anthropology
and
social theory needs to be reestablished. This conversation would allow
the collaboration between “non-Western” and “Western” ideas
of modernity, which Kahn feels has been neglected in recent years. Kahn
does not suggest that this dialogue would be harmonious, only necessary
for both fields. Kahn examines ways that anthropology has been more or
less “forced into [encounters] with both Western modernity and
Western narratives of modernization.” He uses his studies in Kahn’s research began in the early 1970's in the
Indonesian Kahn also looks at the reflexivity, or the “discovery,” by anthropologists and their critics that knowledge produced by anthropology is not innocent. The ethnographies produced are not simply reflections of a “pre-given social and cultural reality” but are a “construction” created by a combination of the culture being studied, the ethnographer and the context both are in. Because an ethnography is created, not just from the people involved but its historic context, it must be revisited and reestablished as that culture changes within its historical context. Kahn finally looks at the “critical musings” of the “construction problem” of anthropology as a “confrontation between ‘the West and the Rest.’ ” He observes that critical theory already precipitates similar conflicts between central-eastern Europe and northwestern Europe as well as between “cores” and “peripheries” of nations in the 19th century. Anthropology and its applications are affected by globalization and historical context the same as are cultures. There were fifteen comments on this article including Englund and Leach, whose earlier article on modernity sparked Kahn’s interest in the subject. And, although he did not agree entirely with all their positions, they did inspire his research and expression of his own position on modernity and anthropology. Kahn was “gratified by the number and variety of responses.” He was also “somewhat taken aback” at negative tones of some of the “more critical” comments. In general, Kahn appreciated and acknowledged the criticisms. He appreciated Rockmore’s “elegant” restatement of his assumptions. And, Goh’s comments were seen as useful in pointing out the importance of revising understands of modernity. CLARITY: 3
Kahn, Joel S. Anthropology and Modernity. Current Anthropology December, 2001 Vol.42(5):651-680. This article attempts to reposition the self-referential
ethnography by detailing ethnographers’ refusal to dispense with
the concept of modernity. Kahn, having worked in Kahn advocates a synchronic view of modernity: the world as it is now is modern, alongside ethnographic analysis of the relationships with the concept itself. He criticizes ethnographers’ definitions of modernity as overly evolutionary. Kahn points out that postmodernism has merely allowed for the reversal of our value judgments about modernity. Modernity itself still rules our analysis of a culture, only now it can be considered a bad development as well as a good development. Kahn uses the writing of local ethnographers and anecdotal evidence to support his claims about modernity. He generalizes that ethnographers have essentially been unable to find a balance of local versions of modernity and a valueless modernity. He seems to use a very specific definition of ethnography that denies some of the changes that might have come through due to postmodernism. The ethnographers he portrays seem to be interested and in touch with the people, but lacking in theoretical background. The major criticisms of Kahn’s argument come against his descriptions. He is accused of generalizing and oversimplifying. At some points, it seems that he is just saying don’t do bad ethnographies. The ethnographies he complain about are those which do not conform to postmodern ideals of cultural and modernity relativism. Englund points out that much of Kahn’s argument uses a “‘traditionalist understanding’ of ethnography.” According to his critics, Kahn misses the point. He is criticizing exactly what everybody else is criticizing except when they quote it, he thinks they agree with it. He worries about definitions of modernity that the people he is responding to deal with in the same way. Essentially, they agree with his argument because his points are representative of the norm. Kahn’s response is biting. He restates his points and chastises his critics for not wanting to move the debate forwards. He re-criticizes Englund and Leach for their disdainful rebukes, but does not change his stance. He still goes on to criticize ethnographers’ us and them relationships with their interlocutors. He doesn’t respond to the criticism that these relationships, framed in terms of us and them, are already frowned upon, and moves back to our ideas of modernity. He reassures us that we really do need to change our relationship with modernity, but doesn’t clarify why his way is different from the ways of his critics.
Kirsch, Stuart. Lost Worlds: Environmental Disaster, “Culture Loss,” and the Law. Current Anthropology 2001 Vol. 42(2):167-198. Stuart Kirsch is looking at the concept of cultural property, and what
this means in terms of law and anthropological concepts. His main examples
in the article are the Ok Tedi mine in Finding precedence of value in culture loss was found in the Eisenring v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, where property is seen as something of more than monetary value. There is more at stake than the money value of a particular piece of land when a person’s entire life and livelihood is based on this piece of land. To explain the loss experienced by the Marshallese, Kirsch looks at several different aspects, including property as a way of knowing, value of subsistence production, place and community, and property and alienability. None of these are easily figured into a monetary structure, and Kirsch looks at how this is played out in the legal system. He argues that cultural property rights are important in that cultural loss is real through the fact that indigenous people feel this sense of loss, and they wish to return to previous ways of life, yet are not allowed to due to pressures from governments, as well as loss of land. Indigenous peoples are often tied to the land, and removal from their environment destroys this aspect of their culture, and in turn, all of their culture. Kirsch sees the testimony of the anthropologists as important to the process of understanding and dealing with the losses faced by indigenous peoples. Their testimony is key as expert witnesses in cases concerning questions of culture. In response to comments on this article, Kirsch states that if culture loss is felt and monetary reconciliation cannot be met, it is important for those at fault to at least claim responsibility for their actions. He also looks at ideas concerning indigeneity, and possibility of this idea being used as way for indigenous groups to claim rights over lands, while other minority groups, who are tied to the land, are not given the same rights. Ideas of indigeneity should be about connection to something. There should be meaning to these claims, and in this way all of these groups have claims. Through this meaning, one’s culture becomes tied to the land. JAMAL
Lambek, Michael. The Anthropology of Religion and the Quarrel between Poetry and Philosophy. Current Anthropology 2001 Vol. 41(3):309-320. Lambek offers an in-depth discussion on the focus of anthropology of religion and the role history has played in shaping ideas about power, morality and religion itself. He divides the commentary into four parts, each covering a different point. Much of Lambek’s article focuses on interpretation of Aristotle’s ideas about morality and complementary ideas offered by Rappaport. Historically, Plato gave the first discourse in epistemology by describing the distinction, and opposition, of rational contemplation and sensual engagement. This distinction frames the prevalent Western notion of the dichotomy between objective (rational) and subjective (sensual) mind and body. Aristotle, on the other hand, offers a third line of reasoning into the equation – reasoned action (praxis) and creative production (poiesis). Lambek argues that creative and practical wisdom play a role in all human societies. In the section titled, “From Power to Morality,” Lambek points out that power mutually gives order to religion and offers a means to challenge authority. Ritual practices demonstrate symbolic adaptations of power, while morality and power interact in a complex fashion. Morality is more than just a referee of power and desire, however. It is a way of living. Next, in “The Scope of the Moral: Aristotle and Rappaport,” Lambek indicates the agreement of the two authors that ritual practices reflect the ideals of societies. Aristotelian morality is the balance between extremes of potential human actions, and ritual mark definitive instances of finding that balance. However, rituals can be defied if the Good is found in the contradiction. Thus, morality and ritual shape one another. Morality is not, however, just a set of rules, but rather a practical application of virtuous reasoning. Here Lambek points out that morality is not exclusive to religious practice, but transcends into everyday life. Morality is also more than habit, as Lambek addresses in “A Dieu, Bourdieu: Morality as Disposition and as Practice.” Moral principles entail both reasoning and an understanding of virtue. Since morality deals with a continuum between extremes, there can be no science of morality. Rather it comes from within individuals who possess a practical wisdom of virtue. An incontinent individual may have the ability to rationalize moral action but will still lack moral disposition. Here again, ritual offer occasions to practice moral disposition in a culturally fashioned manner. In conclusion, Lambek proposes that religion gives direction and means to moral practice by making individuals contemplate morality. Even though some anthropology of religion may still focus on Plato’s dichotomy and the mutual distinction between the ideal, imagined world and the everyday one, Aristotle offers reasoning that makes it possible to conjoin the contemplative and the sensual. Practice should be viewed more in terms of practical reasoning, and the study of structured, rule-bound religion should look more at moral practice rather than stated guidelines. CLARITY RANKING: 2
Lewis, Herbert S. Boas, In the article the author starts by setting up his intentions, some of which are telling of a new interpretation of Boas’ works, interpretation of Boas’ philosophy, and how they react with current science and beliefs of culture and behavior. In the first section of the article some of the criticisms of Boas are put into light through exhaustive quotations of people’s dismissals of Boas and Boasian theory. But, in the next section the author counter-argues for Boas. Here he says that Boas actually understood science in a much grander scale than his detractors would give him credit for, as described in the previous section. Mainly, the author again uses many quotes of leading or prominent anthropologists to make his point. Also, he combines Ernst Mayr’s definition of science and Boas’ quotes to concrete Boas as a proponent for hard science, which is the main point of the section. Then the author turns to Boas’ influence on pragmatism. Here the author strays away from using quotations and instead shows that Boas and some of his students wrote works that are fundamental elements in pragmatic views, such as The Dial, The Freeman, The Nation, and The New Republic. Next, the author turns to defining pragmatism, and summarizes some of the main views of this ‘ism’. Here it is explained that pragmatism is antifoundationalist, meaning that there are not absolute truths, but instead there are theories that can always be made better. Also, pragmatism is founded on pluralism and diversity, along with contingency and chance, individual phenomena versus the whole, and the importance of the individual. All these factors were summarized in a few short paragraphs each. Then the author turns his attention to the way In the next few sections the author sums up the views of Boas, along with influences on early cultural anthropology. First, the author quotes many people to demonstrate Boas’ early works, then reinterpretation of Boas is put forth to demonstrate some key issues such as individuals, process, and the like. Finally, the author concludes the article with a synopsis of Boas and his views. The author presents four suggestions regarding why Boas should be reanalyzed: reconsideration by current generations, there was no practice theory in Boas’ time, the increasing interest in Darwinian views, and what will follow current views in anthropology. The author first replies to Darnell’s comments by stating that they both appreciate certain authors. Also, the author replies to one specific comment of Darnell’s by stating that most commentators seem to look at the divergences of Darwin and Boas. Later, Lewis responds to two letters, Harkin’s and Price’s, by stating that these two illustrate one of the points of the article: “anthropology has never had a hegemonic center but has always been characterized by diverse perspectives- and always will be.” CLARITY: 3
Lewis, Herbert S. Boas, This article explains a century worth of reactions to Franz Boas, and attempts to convince the reader of the relevance of Boas today. Lewis’ argument is framed or inspired by a perceived attempt to redefine anthropology after postmodernism. He explains the changing reception that Boas’ work received, and he says that it is time we came full circle. In the first half of the century, Boas’ ideas governed American anthropology, but that dominance was threatened by the attacks of Leslie White and other neo-evolutionists. Now, after postmodernity, Lewis thinks we are moving towards a balanced place supported by Boas. Lewis defines Franz Boas’ position on numerous points in order to give his readers the feel that Boas was truly a postmodernist, and presents Boas as a strong example of a post-postmodern anthropologist. Lewis’ argument moves from Boas’ writings to those of his
detractors and then to postmodern writings. The author first explains
the conflict between Boas and people like White; he then outlines his
understanding of Boas in order to prove that his detractors were misinterpreting
him. Having established the impossibility of White et al.’s legitimacy,
Lewis begins his analysis of Boas’ relationship with The response to Lewis are quite straightforward in agreeing with the most basic premise of Lewis’ argument, but none of the details. The responses criticize Lewis’ one sided portrayal of Boas. Multiple articles refer to Lewis’ use of only the methodological aspects of Franz Boas’ work. They mention that this is even ironic because any theory made about Boas, with his commitment to drawing conclusions from a multitude of details, should come from his massive ethnographic work instead of from his quite sparse theoretical work. As a unified whole the responses then criticize Lewis’ characterization of Boas as a proto-postmodernist. They assert that the characterization is false because, though Boas was a relativist morally, that is very different from not believing one could even comprehend the culture or worldview of another. Boas was over-deified. Lewis answers these criticisms with apologies. He admits to the one-sided portrayal and to the fact that Boas was not at all postmodern. He then defends his decision to argue that way. Lewis sees postmodernism undermining anthropology’s reliance on the field, and though he is grateful for the open-mindedness it brought to the discipline, he thinks there are many that crave change and influence to come from inside anthropology, thus he felt drawn to present Boas as one of the possible influences. CLARITY: 4 ARTHUR GILLETT Davidson college (Eriberto Lozada)
Lieberman, Leonard. How “Caucasoids” Got Such Big Crania and Why They Shrank From Morton to Rushton Current Anthropology 2001 Vol. 42(1):69-95. Lieberman has formulated a powerful and comprehensive critique of Philippe Rushton’s body of work that espouses the controversial view that cranial size, and a host of behavioral traits, can be used to determine the intellect of the three “races”. Rushton places them in a hierarchical order with Mongoloid at the top, Caucasian in the middle and Negroid at the bottom. In Lieberman’s view, this is a return to the anthropological racist views of the nineteenth century, combined with sociobiological thought about genetic determinism of the twentieth century. He begins by asking why Rushton decided to place the Mongoloid race at the top when it had for so long been in the middle. He answers his question by accusing Rushton of being overly influenced by the fact that Japanese society was, at the time (1980’s), surging ahead in its attempt to become the largest economy in the world and drawing the conclusion that Asians belonged at the top of the hierarchy. The more important question that Lieberman raises is “how it is possible to support 19th century racism by citing late 20th century anthropological research that is opposed to the notion of race”. In answer, Lieberman reviews the history of cranioracial labeling. He begins with Morton, who, in the mid nineteenth century, established the order of C>M>N in regards to cranial capacity, which he directly related to intelligence. Although rife with methodological error this ranking was widely accepted and had a broad societal impact. But as Lieberman points out, Morton was working within the framework of society and the state of scientific knowledge at that time. Rushton is working in a time where anthropologists no longer recognize the three “races” as having any meaning, apart from a forensic application. Lieberman contends that Rushton based his mathematical correlations on invalid measurements. “It appears that the claims made by Rushton about cranial size and IQ are based on a hodgepodge of cranial measurements and a stew of intelligence assessments that lack both content and construct validity.” He claims that Rushton has failed to utilize well-established control variables in brain measurements. Lieberman points out that although he uses IQ as a measure of intelligence, Rushton has totally ignored a large body of research relating environment, nutrition, cranial size and IQ. Lieberman particularly calls into question Rushton’s assertion that an aggregation of diverse behavioral traits assigned to different races can place each race in a hierarchy of levels of civilization. In response to critiques the author points out that Rushton is still ignoring his critics’ data and theoretical framework and ignoring the context of the sources of his data by citing the endocranial volumes of several researchers “without acknowledging that they report a high correlation with cranial volume and latitude and a very low correlation with ‘race’ ”. He answers the observation that Rushton does not attribute inferior and superior to the behavioral traits that he lists by questioning the meaning of such terms as civilization and cultural achievement when ranked from 1 to 3. Lieberman’s largest concern is contained in his observation that it does not matter if Caucasians or Asians are number one in the hierarchy; what matters is that the hierarchy is used “to justify the exploitation of those at the bottom” CLARITY RANKING: 4
Lieberman, Leonard. How “Caucasoids” Got Such Big Crania and Why They Shrank: From Morton to Rushton. Current Anthropology February, 2001. Vol.42(1):69-95. By the end of the 20th century, anthropologists had mostly abandoned the concept of biological “race.” As anthropology rose as the study of evolution, European superiority was assumed, evident in the works of Spencer, Tyler, and Morgan. Working in the same context during the mid-19th century, Samuel G. Morton collected crania and measured volumetric capacity to conclude a hierarchy of brain size placing “Caucasoids” at the top, then “Mongoloids,” and finally “Negroids.” Now, these same issues are resurfacing in J. Philippe Rushton’s studies, although the hierarchy has been altered to Mongoloids> Caucasoids> Negroids. Lieberman asks two main questions in his paper: why has the hierarchy changed between the works of Morton and Rushton, and how can Rushton support “19th century racism” in an era in which biologically determined race has been removed from the field of anthropology? It is easy to realize that the cultural context of Morton’s work supported a ranking of intelligence correlated with cranial capacity, but Lieberman criticizes Rushton for perpetuating the justification of “the exploitation of those at the bottom.” Lieberman points out Morton’s methodical, and scientific efforts, while Rushton speaks broadly, and more importantly, cites authors out of context. Reasons that biocultural anthropologists should be concerned with Rushton’s assertions include his use of the theory of evolution as an explanation for cultural differences, and changes in ideology of writers who formerly condoned biological explanations for race. Problems with Rushton’s theories that Lieberman cites are the use of the term “race,” the unclear boundaries of “races” in his work, misrepresentation of other author’s data, incomplete reporting of methods used in fieldwork, non-consideration of particular variables, and the use of correlation as causality. Most of the responses to Lieberman’s articles are positive, reinforcing the racist element of Rushton’s work. Henry Harpending comments “we have to face the likelihood that culture areas are partially determined by gene areas” but it seems that Lieberman’s argument is more against the direct association of intelligence and brain size, and the importance of correct methodology. How would one prove that culture areas are determined by gene areas? Lieberman believes in the cultural differences before biological differences. Rushton actually responds to Lieberman, emphasizing the predictive power of his studies, which he uses to say that “race” is a valid concept. He goes on to give some of his statistics, a technique which Lieberman says “follows a familiar pattern—ignoring his critics’ data and theoretical framework, ignoring the context of the sources of his data, and citing additional data on cranial size and IQ and the alleged inferiority of Africans that depend on the same erroneous assumptions that have repeatedly been called to his attention.” Rushton even uses statements from Boas, the ultimate in cultural relativism, in support of his argument. Lieberman’s article emphasizes the necessity to fight against Rushton’s attempt to revitalize Morton’s theories in a contextually inappropriate academic environment. “The differences between human societies can only be explained by the collective efforts of anthropologists, historians, and geographers examining ecology, cultural contact, colonialism, and economic globalization.” CLARITY:4
Hurtado, Hill, Kaplan, and Lancaster write a medically
informed article directed at the American Anthropological Association
(AAA), and in response
to Patrick Tierney’s book Darkness in The article begins on a defensive stance to cover up for the harsh claims Tierney makes against anthropologists and others initiating first contacts with isolated groups. They conclude basically in agreement with Tierney, however. They argue that attempting contact with indigenous tribes is generally good for the health and survival of the tribes, but only with continued availability of medical care. This is evidenced by a great deal of medical explanation as well as descriptions of successful contacts including prolonged medical care. After 500 years of European contact with natives of the
Priest, Robert J. Missionary Positions: Christian, Modernist, Postmodernist. Current Anthropology 2001 Vol. 42(1):29-68. In Missionary Positions, Priest critically examines the historical origins of the phrase “missionary position.” He acknowledges its use as an expression of face-to-face, man-on-top sexual intercourse. The assumed origins of the expression are generally thought to reflect Polynesians’, Africans’, Chinese’, Native Americans’, or Melanesians’ references to imposed missionary morals regarding sexual expression as limited to heterosexual, man-on-top intercourse. Priest explores the expression as a symbol in modernist and postmodernist discourses. It has been used to symbolize many concepts including ethnocentrism, taboos, sins, social others, anti-life/anti-pleasure, morality and power, dominance, procreative sex, and natural vs. unnatural sex. Priest uses an impressive volume of examples to build a case against modernist methods and pretense of objectiveness. At the heart of his argument is the true history behind the expressions itself. The phrase “missionary position” was coined by Kinsey, the modernist famous for the most extensive sex-survey to date of sexual practices and activities in the U.S. Kinsey coined the phrase in his work, Sexual Behavior in the Human Male, by misquoting Malinowski as using the expression to refer to the native reaction to the missionaries’ preferred sexual position. There is no account of this expression in any of Malinowski’s work. This falsification of sources and the ramifications that resulted are an example of modernism at work. It is impossible to be objective. One’s biases and interests unavoidably influence the aspects the researcher explores and the conclusions she or he makes. Kinsey’s struggle to justify his bi-sexuality and his disenchantment with Christianity affected his research and his interpretation of other research. Priest uses the history and the overwhelming ramifications of coining the term “missionary position” to lobby for a true postmodernist approach, resulting in the inclusion of fundamentalism in academia. A postmodern approach acknowledges the biases that create and influence vision, perspectives, and motivations, unavoidably shaping research, perception, and interpretations. However, through acknowledging these biases, academia gains contributions to knowledge production, which may have been missed by scholars with other subject positions. Therefore, when religious fundamentalist scholars are banned from academia by other academics, who justify it by claiming it is because of biased fundamental thinking, in essence the fundamentalist scholars are being placed in the “missionary position.” In other words, the myth of the missionary position, in so far as academia is concerned, marginalizes, silences, dominates, and essentializes fundamentalist in an attempt to justify their exclusion. Priest rebutts one commentator who claims to have heard
the expression “missionary
position” two years before the release of Kinsey’s book.
Priest presents the possibility that Kinsey may have told this story
in his lectures that preceded his book. One story told by Kinsey during
his lectures stated the CLARITY RANKING: 4
Priest, Robert J. Missionary Positions, Christian, Modernist, and Postmodernist. Current Anthropology Feb 2001 Vol.42(1):29-72. Robert J. Priest’s article “Missionary Positions” details the myth of the origin of the “missionary position” expression and analyzes the implications of this false typing for Christians in modernist and postmodernist anthropology. Priest traces the “missionary position” to an accusation by Kinsey that Malinowski coined the phrase in his studies of the Trobrianders, but no documentation of this phrase is available. Because of the lack of concrete origin, Priest concludes that Kinsey conflated several stories and instances to arrive at today’s “missionary position.” Priest argues that the symbol’s meaning has generated discourse that links the phrase with Christians and those who once defined modernism as superior, those who considered others’ behavior irrational, essentially those without the anthropologist’s gift for cultural relativism. Priest believes the missionary has never risen above historical stereotypes due to lack of study and quick judgment. The missionary implies one who forces the idea of sin onto a people unjustly. According to Priest, “When the myth of the missionary position is used to evoke the theme that Christian morality is really but a cover for dominance and power, it is not only patriarchy which is in view but the dominance of the missionary over the native social other,” (2001:13), a critique that renders the missionary the symbol for ethnocentrism, and one that also makes a modernist objection against Christianity. The missionary position is also a postmodern symbol. However, the postmodernist tendency to view the body as text does little to reverse the missionary potion as a symbol of patriarchy, dominance, and power. However, Priest says, “by postmodernists this symbol [the missionary position] is employed to argue that modernism itself is a morality of negation, that it is ethnocentric, and that it lacks adequate foundations” (2001:20). The anthropological community has excluded Christian voices on allegations of bias and illegitimacy. Even the most outside perspective has an agenda, and while one can argue that even if the origin of the symbol is faulty, its implications are real, Priest insists the “missionary position” is a tool for exclusion. Christians remain outside today, because disclosing their position to modernists discredited them. And although postmodernism values the subject position, the problem still exists, that “if Christian subject positions are not discreditable because they alone fail to be neutral, then perhaps they are discreditable for having a unique propensity for abuse of power” (Priest 2001:27). According to Priest, the “missionary position” invoked and invokes this false analysis, and the false narrative empowers those who uphold it to create a false reality, where Christian ideas and analyses lie outside of anthropological academic discourse. While many commentators agree Priest raised necessary arguments about the exclusion of religious contemporaries due to modernist objections, others feel Christian voices often draw on their religious subject position for authority and harbor a larger moral objective in their writing. Other critiques argue Priest uses “evangelical,” “fundamentalist,” “modern,” “postmodern,” and “myth” loosely and ineffectively. Some felt that the prevalence of the “missionary position,” was evidence enough that it holds some truth about the Christian worldview and the Christian vision. They assert that anthropology necessarily pins cultural relativism against moral convictions, which is why the term persists. In Priest’s reply, he reaffirms the “missionary position” as a false social construct of values and motives, which qualifies as myth. While Priest admits, “there is a sense in which the symbol is more real than the real,” (2001:54) he maintains its persistence is due to modernist agitators, not true social concerns. He refutes the allegation that Christianity is always “Western,” and “projective,” as Christianity traversed the historical world, not particularly |
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