|
|
| |
Current
Anthropology 1998
Applbaum, Kalman. The Sweetness of Salvation, Consumer Marketing and the Liberal-Bourgeois Theory of Needs. Current Anthropology June, 1998 Vol. 39(3): 323-349. Consumer marketing and the liberal-bourgeois theory of needs, the subtitle of this article, becomes a complex for the embedding of needs in everyday practice, and the perpetuation of a "Western cosmological duality of suffering and salvation" (Applbaum, 1998:324). Moreover, Applbaum claims, "the way in which marketers change the conditions of consumer reality is mainly by intensifying, rationalizing, and universalizing existing tendencies, not by altering either extant culture categories or the core cosmology of capitalism, to which marketing itself perforce conforms." (Applbaum, 1998:324). Applbaum utilizes the theoretical framework of Bourdieu in order to analyze consumer behavior. Although he argues that, "[t]he social order being reproduced is less class structure than an order that signifies itself in practical, rationalist terms as 'the marketplace' "(Applbaum, 1998:324). This clearly weakens the lens of perception due to the fact that Bourdieu's framework works better at showcasing class distinction and taste based upon class privilege or poverty. John Clammer, one of the commentators gives Applbaum a scathing indictment on this theoretical approach. James McDonald also delivers a desire for a more thorough examination of Baudrillard, Bourdieu and Lefebvre (the main body of analysis can be found on pages 331-332). At any rate, he does show the evident power relationship and how it is manipulated to dealienate or deliver the mass majority from suffering. Applbaum strives to show that marketers and consumers make up the marketing effort. He maintains that both are necessary and utilize each others need and desire for fulfillment in order to achieve "salvation", which in the end is shown to be a hoax. This article is clearly thought provoking and Applbaum makes a good point of showing the embedded nature of the liberal-bourgeois system of needs/wants in our contemporary economic praxis. The professional commentators almost unanimously agreed that the topic and discussion were on the mark, but most also agreed that more time could have been spent unpacking some of the theory. In short, Applbaum's haste in making his argument leaves the reader and the social theorist/philosopher wanting. Applbaum makes it clear in his reply that he could have opened up his theoretical stance, shown a dynamic power relationship, and clarifies the linkage of this paper to Sahlins' discussion of American cosmology. The article is well written and structured. CLARITY: 4.
Applbaum, Kalman. The Sweetness of Salvation: Consumer Marketing and the Liberal-Bourgeois Theory of Needs. Current Anthropology June, 1998 Vol.39(3):323-348. This paper analyzes the idea of needs
as defined by Marshall Sahlins in the 1996 paper “The Sadness of Sweetness: the Native Anthropology
of Western Cosmology” in marketing and consumer behaviour. Applbaum
describes the perpetuation of the western idea of suffering and salvation
through market interactions of marketers and consumers. The origins
of the suffering philosophy of humans as imperfect and bent on the
satisfaction of desires, is cited in the biblical tale of the Original
Sin, and reiterated by Using the ideas of Bourdieu, Applbaum links product categories to perceived categories of needs. Through processes of alienation and dealienation, marketers can aid the public in curing their perceived needs and consciousness of need fulfillment and can help to alleviate feelings of alienation by permitting the consumer to distinguish and identify themselves by way of the products chosen. The process is considered to work because of the ideal of free choice which the consumers hold close to heart. By choosing myriad products distinct from others’ myriad choices, an identity can be established. Fantasy and imagined purchasing communities are also seen to be driving forces. The consumptive nature of modern life is cited from Lefebvre and Baudrillard. Comments The comments focus on some basic flaws, such as the consumptive power of groups such as families, rather than a rigidly individual perspective, and the fundamental lack of faith in consumers, namely the assumption of reacting only to an object’s symbolism. His “ethnographic” evidence is also criticized, due to its staged nature and the fact that it was a singular event. Power relations are also questioned, as Applbaum portrays marketers and consumers as equal partners, rather than the more common idea of portraying the marketer as a manipulator. Reply Applbaum’s reply follows from interviews with dozens of marketers who don’t consider themselves to be dominating or hegemonic but perceive themselves instead as entering into a situation in which both parties know the rules and therefore are both free to abstain. Marketers claim to be more concerned about the competition than increasing their market share. With these thoughts in mind, Applbaum dismisses the idea that consumer are helpless targets. CLARITY: 4
This article is a criticism of Thomas Huffman’s theory of Great Zimbabwe. Beach states that Huffman’s work has misunderstood historical Portuguese documents and misinterpreted oral traditions in the vicinity. Huffman is also criticized of having a static view of the use of space over time during the height of the Great Zimbabwe state. Beach then goes on to offer an imagined guess at how Great Zimbabwe came into existence and proposes that it is closer to the truth than Huffman’s work due to Huffman’s mistaken synthesis of information. The height of the Great Zimbabwe state
is believed to be from around the years 1200 – 1500 and was also believed to be from the Shona
people who currently live in the area. Two key developments in the
study of the site were: in 1905, David Randall-McIver established the
date and African origins of Great Zimbabwe; and in the 1970’s,
when Huffman’s studies of the dwellings outside the stone walls
led to the belief that the entire area, not just the specific site,
was an entire civilization covering a large political community like
a nation, not just a city on its own in the countryside anomalous of
others. Beach believes that most of Huffman’s conclusions since
this breakthrough are flawed. Some of these flaws are described in
the article such as Huffman’s misinterpretations of: rulers association
with high ground, male and female living quarters and power, religious
meanings of buildings and there placements, symbols and there meaning
on walls, the importance and meaning of carved stone birds, and female
initiations. Beach also displays a mistake in Huffman’s reasoning
because he borrows practices from other local natives like the Beach says that his own version of Great Zimbabwe is there to create conversation, not to be taken as a definitive theory. But he does state that the main reason he fashions this theory is to counter his main complaint about Huffman’s work: “Where I think Huffman’s idea is weakest is in its treatment of Great Zimbabwe as a single community, almost as a village writ large, and as a static one in which the entire pattern of settlement remained more or less the same over at least two centuries.” Beach describes Great Zimbabwe as a political center and one that had a slow decline, not a sudden one. The leaders as they came into power at different times, lived in different sections of the city. They were able to copy Mapungubwe’s design and, over time were able to control most all of the region including its predecessor Mapungubwe. Other satellite areas were built in the style of Great Zimbabwe and over the centuries the builders improved their technique of stone work. Beach describes political turmoil in ascension for the throne at points over the centuries that lead to military strife occasionally. The city slowly declines after 1450 with emigration of factions and competition from the Khami and Mutapa states until the city is finally abandoned. Overall, the comments by colleagues support the criticism by Beach’s reply to the comments are start by explaining that his criticism was already published before Huffman’s latest paper had been so Beach retracts those statements that Huffman had already changed his mind about. Beach defends his criticism of Huffman’s ideas on initiation rites in Great Zimbabwe due to the negative evidence of the 400 years of Portuguese documents not mentioning anything about them. Beach again claims that his imaginary hypothesis on the politics of the Great Zimbabwe state, are not something likely to be proved nor disproved. The theory is only to lead the discussion in a new way that is more probable than Huffman’s. CLARITY: 3
In this article, Beach examines and criticizes
Thomas Huffman’s
reconstruction of sites in Great Zimbabwe especially concerning time,
space, and discipline. The space that was once Great Zimbabwe is now
occupied by speakers of the Shona language. Huffman’s work on
Great Zimbabwe began in the 1980’s because of a large interest
in the distinctive stone architecture. Beach stresses that Great Zimbabwe
and its associated sites offer many opportunities for cross-disciplinary
studies. Huffman is a cognitive archaeologist, yet he relies heavily
upon oral traditions of the Shona people. Beach notes that connections
between features of the ruins and modern Shona material culture cause
speculation. He notes here that Shona people themselves are speculators, however,
there is few documents that refer to stone architecture. Huffman refers
to many Portuguese documents to backup his ideas concerning stone architect
in Beach also reviews an earlier article
by Huffman “The Cognitive
Archaeology of Great Zimbabwe” which states two crucial developments,
the date and African origin of the stone structures, and the ordinary
dwellings of the town of Beach follows in Huffman’s foot steps by suggesting a model that uses oral traditions and documentary evidence. He calls this method his working hypothesis which stimulates the debate and shows that the same information can form different images. He believes that Huffman’s weakest argument states the idea that Great Zimbabwe has remained a single static community. He proves this with his political model of the settlement and geographical layout of Great Zimbabwe. His major argument or concern is that there are many variations that can come out of oral traditions. He states that his model is plausible but based on imagination. Comments The commentators seem to think Beach’s argument is plausible and his criticisms convincing. They agree with Beach that Great Zimbabwe is an exceptional site for testing interdisciplinary studies. They state that he did a job well done proving the misunderstandings and manipulative selections of Huffman’s data. They also agree that Huffman seems to be overlooking possibilities with regards to politics. The commentators do note some ambiguity. Loubser states that Beaches methodological concerns are justified, but this does not mean anthropologists should abandon oral traditions altogether. This is a very valid point considering the articles negative attitudes towards oral traditions. Reply Beach replies first by pointing out that clarity is not easily achieved,
especially for Great Zimbabwe. Great CLARITY: 3
Beteille, Andre. The Idea of Indigenous People. Current Anthropology, April 1998. vol. 39, (2): 187- 192. Beteille’s commentary discusses the historical background that was once the forefront of anthropology, which is what he describes as interest in “primitive” or “preliterate cultures or societies” He argues that although anthropology was started through the examination and studies of the people throughout the world, it is still done today and thus the classification of groups of people have caused many problems. These problems start with the definition of tribes or tribal communities.
There are many different kinds of tribes throughout the world and though
there exist many similarities between them,
the differences amongst them are equal to that. He states that some
of the best ethnographies do not use working definitions to describe
a “so called tribe”. This is because; the general definition
of a tribe is a self-contained primitive and isolated group of people.
Using this definition in many places can be a contradiction to itself.
The best example of this is in Beteille moves on to discuss the term “indigenous” and
the definition of indigenous people exhibits many discursive problems
as well. He explains that indigenous people are a group of people that
have always existed in the area which they currently live. However,
with in anthropology that is not the case of many so called “indigenous
people”. Many anthropologists use the term indigenous to refer
to people who live in places that are only isolated or different from
the contemporary society that exists around them. He then asks the
question of what is too be done regarding this issue? He states indigenous
is used the same as “native” and in many cases and both
are often wrongly stated. Native should apply only to North America
and In the end of his commentary he dabbles into a possible reason why this could be which he explains as moral excitation among anthropologists of today. He states that organizational disciplines and the definitions used by many of them today are causing much confusion in the intellectual world, and furthermore are providing ideological ammunition to those who want to reorganize the world by claims of blood and soil. CLARITY: 3
Beteille, Andre. The Idea of Indigenous People. Current Anthropology April, 1998 Vol. 39(2):187-191. In this article, Beteille discusses the concept of indigenous peoples. He asserts that it is problematic because it lacks a clear definition, and as a result does not function to distinguish between different social groups. The term indigenous lacks meaning and applicability, and has simply become the replacement word for “native” in contemporary anthropological discourse. With this concern in mind, Beteille suggests some concepts that should apply to the term indigenous. He begins by stating that the term refers to a particular type of society, and defines two features of that society; indigenous peoples possess a history of settlement in a particular geographic area, and have had that settlement usurped by foreign populations. Beteille does not intend for this description to be a definition of indigenous because the ideas he presents are themselves problematic. A history of settlement may be difficult to demonstrate in some cases, and in other cases different groups may be able to demonstrate long-term settlement in the same area. At the same time, many areas have histories of continuous population movement and, correspondingly, population displacement. In some cases, population displacement is a consequence of foreign settlement, and in other cases it is the result of relations between long-term occupants of larger geographic regions. The issue is further complicated by the fact that, in some areas, it is difficult to differentiate groups on the bases of physical appearance, language, and, at least to an extent, culture. The point is, despite a conception of what an indigenous population should be, it can be a complicated task to associate one group as being indigenous to a given area instead of another. The term indigenous is important because it represents an effort to distinguish between different social groups. Such a distinction is necessary from both a theoretical and practical perspective. Anthropological theory requires some way of accurately and meaningfully describing indigenous populations. With regard to contemporary social problems, the designation ‘indigenous’ is often the basis from which legal and constitutional rights are defined, and from which social problems are understood and addressed. For these reasons, it is important that the idea of indigenous peoples becomes meaningfully elaborated and fully understood. CLARITY: 5 BEN VAN DER GRACHT Okanagan University College (Diana E. French)
Boesch, Christophe and Michael Tomasello. Chimpanzee and Human Cultures. Current Anthropology, December 1998. vol. 39 (5): 591- 614. In this article, Boesch and Tomasello discuss the notion of culture by specifically discussing differences between humans and chimpanzees. Their central theoretical point of this article states that culture is in fact monolithic within a group of organisms. This is done by examining different types of social learning processes which lead to cultural traditions with human and chimpanzee groups. By examining their (human and chimps.) cultural differences they argue that it is evident that chimps may exhibit a form of culture that has not been researched long and hard enough to determine. The article begins by discussing the problem with the definition of culture. Boesch and Tomasello argue that culture has a different meaning to practically every social science. Furthermore, within most social sciences exists different definitions. The basic dichotomy between the biological approach and the psychological one is very different when discussing “culture”. Boesch and Tomasello have come up with criteria for naturally occurring behavior to meet in order to explain culture. This criteria states that; if two groups of the same species differ in behavior with a countable number of individuals conforming, and if there are no obvious differences in the environment of these two groups; and if there are no genetic differences between the individuals that acquire the behavior with those that do not, then an organism displays culture. Thus, according to this developed criteria, chimps have displayed some form of “culture”. The second half of the article is spent discussing the ways an individual acquires a particular practice; focusing again on chimps. According to “psychologists” this is “social learning”, when one individual is behaving similarly to another. This can be learned thru either instrumental or communicative behaviors. CLARITY:
Boesch, Christophe and Michael Tomasello. Chimpanzee and Human Cultures. Current Anthropology December, 1998 Vol.39(5):591-614. This article deals with the similarities and differences between human and chimpanzee cultures. The authors come from different backgrounds and have varying theoretical approaches and they say that their paper is an attempt to reconcile these differences. They also state that they hope to guide future research in the direction of what is most important to understand about chimpanzee cultures. In this article, Boesch and Tomasello argue that evolutionary roots may be shared between human and chimpanzee populations because they share many cultural similarities. They begin by stating that there are many different views regarding culture, and different disciplines approach culture in different ways. They set up a basic dichotomy between biological and psychological approaches to the problem of understanding culture. The first section discusses specific population behaviors among chimpanzees. It examines the cultural behaviors of four different groups of wild chimpanzees from an evolutionary perspective. Boesch and Tomasello describe the different ways in which humans and chimpanzees acquire certain behavior with genetic transmission, individual learning and social learning. They examine population specific behaviors among chimpanzees and how certain ones are present or absent in different populations and also how the form and function of behaviors can differ between populations. The next section deals with the patterns of dissemination that occur within populations. They examine how social structure affects information transfer and all the ways that individuals can select different cultural variants. The third section deals with different types of social learning, which produce different behavioral practices and evolving cultural traditions. It evaluates both instrumental and communicative learning as ways in which behavior becomes relatively uniform within a group. The authors discuss emulation learning as used by both chimpanzee and human populations and they also talk about imitative learning, which is definitely used by humans, and may or may not be used by chimpanzees. In the last section, the authors examine some recent research on social learning among captive chimpanzees. They state that the ratchet effect, definitely found among humans, may be found among chimpanzee populations as well, but that chimpanzees have not been studied long enough to find proper evidence of it. In the conclusion, Boesch and Tomasello state that they can only focus on the similarities and differences between human and chimpanzee cultures, because they cannot safely make a conclusion as to the shared evolutionary roots as there are still too many questions that need answering. Comments In the comments following the article, there are three major issues brought up. Each commentator has his or her own views regarding culture, which are not the same as Boesch and Tomasello’s idea. Some of the commentators say the ratchet effect can happen at different speeds and that it could be possible for ratcheting to exist among Chimpanzee populations. Another issue brought up by the commentators is with the evidence presented throughout the article. One commentator brings up the point that the authors only examine four different chimpanzee populations, while ethnographic data exist on at least thirty-five. The commentators also note that discussion is mainly about chimpanzee populations and no evidence is presented regarding human cultural processes. Reply The authors state that they knew they would be criticized in their attempt to compromise between biological and psychological views of culture and that nobody in the field can agree so the fact that nobody agrees with their interpretation means it is probably somewhere in the middle. In response to the comment that the ratchet effect could exist among chimpanzee populations, the authors state that it is likely that all cultures can rapidly accumulate information and the fact that we have not yet seen this effect with chimpanzees suggests that it is improbable, but not entirely impossible. CLARITY: 3
Boone, James L. and Eric Alden Smith. Is it Evolution Yet? Current Anthropology, June 1998 V. 39 (Supplement): 141-173. The theory of evolution is most commonly associated with biological changes. However, in James L. Boone and Eric Alden Smith’s article, “Is it Evolution Yet?” this theory is discussed in terms of archeological evidence. They compare two interpretations of this type of archaeology and give examples of how these interpretations are applied to actual archaeological examples. In the article Boone and Smith point out that while both evolutionary archaeology and evolutionary ecology address archaeology in terms of natural selection there is an intrinsic disagreement between the two schools of thought. The two schools of thought differ in the way they incorporate phenotypes into their conclusions. Boone and Smith present evolutionary ecology as a more plausible explanation for the changes over time in the archaeological record. These theories depend upon the concept of artifacts being components of the human phenotype. Therefore changes in the archaeological record reflect changes in human phenotypes. Evolutionary archaeologists see phenotypic change over time as caused by natural selection directly acting on cultural variation while evolutionary ecologists argue that selection acting on heritable variation is only one of several developments which changes the frequency of phenotypic variants through time. Therefore natural selection also plays an important part in these interpretations. The example of the use of snowmobiles in the subarctic is used in the article to demonstrate how the two schools of thought are applied. Through the adaptation to the use of snowmobiles the people living in this area have been able to increase the amount of food they are able to hunt and forage. With this increase in food supply, a larger number of offspring survive to reproductive age. Boone and Smith characterize this within the framework of evolutionary theory through the idea that humans inherit evolved cognitive abilities that allow them to acquire resources that will produce the highest net gains. Boone and Smith conclude their article by stating that while they see evolutionary archaeology and evolutionary ecology are helpful to interpretation, they are not all inclusive. According to the article, these theories allow archaeologists to study behavioral adaptation as evolution in the archaeological record. James L. Boone and Eric Alden Smith received eleven comments in response to “Is it Evolution Yet?”. While most of the commentors praised the two for writing on the subject of evolutionary archaeology and evolutionary ecology, they see the argument as flawed. The argument of Boone and Smith is often seen as too simplistic for the commentors. In their reply, Boone and Smith address the issues of the commentors in five subsections. Each of the subsections answer certain questions posed by a couple different commentors. CLARITY: 3
Brown, Michael F. Can Culture Be Copyrighted? Current Anthropology April, 1998 Vol.39(2):193-222 In this compelling article, author Michael Brown tackles a complicated issue: the moral necessity and difficulty of protecting the cultural property of indigenous peoples versus the question of reasonable access to such materials. Along the way, he questions by what means these materials should and could be protected. The article begins with an example of drawings of a Navajo healing ritual that were found in a museum. These drawings, perhaps made surreptitiously, were based on images that are traditionally destroyed at the end of the ritual. The museum staff worried that the presence of these drawings in their collection was disrespectful or, worse, a violation of privacy norms. This question illuminates problems faced by archivists and curators in light of the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA). Although few anthropologists would deny the legitimacy of the spirit of NAGPRA, questions abound regarding the limits of the law. Specifically, what kinds of material are, and should be protected? According to Brown, the Apache define those materials protected by NAGPRA as including “all images, text, ceremonies, music, songs, stories, symbols, beliefs, customs, ideas and other physical and spiritual objects and concepts” (Brown 1998:194). The point of the article, according to the author, is to broaden the debate regarding the status of indigenous cultural and intellectual property rights. Brown believes that current thinking focuses more on advocacy than on broader issues regarding the protection of intellectual property. Anthropologists are implicated in this process, desiring to empower and protect their subjects, but failing to address how we might maintain the flow of information necessary to what Brown somewhat ambiguously calls a “liberal democracy”. Indigenous peoples’ desire to regain control of their cultural intellectual property is confounded by the fact that “culture” is not a fixed, corporeal thing, but a flexible set of understandings, dispositions and behaviors that change over time (Brown 1998:197). It is further changed by contact with other groups, such that an outside group might incorporate indigenous practices or ideas into their own lives. According to Brown, this is not an attempt to “steal” ideas, or intellectual property, such as a song or a manuscript, but is a natural consequence of contact between cultural groups. As such, Brown appears to be skeptical of some indigenous intellectual property rights protection proposals. A different situation occurs when multinational corporations copyright cultural information, such as medicinal knowledge, for their exclusive profit. In cases such as this, Brown emphatically believes that a process of compensating indigenous people for the use of their knowledge is necessary. This is a thoughtful, well-balanced argument regarding the rights of indigenous people and their desire to protect their cultural knowledge. Commentaries on the article were generally positive, falling into two broad categories defined by the author himself. First were those who would move from analysis toward the creation of concrete policy. Other respondents were more concerned with broader issues, including property rights, questions regarding the ownership of knowledge, and concerns over the rights of ethnic groups in multicultural states (Brown 1998: 218). Brown responds to these comments by discussing three areas in which he and most commentators agreed. First, the language used to discuss social problems is often a problematic and insufficient means of dealing with real problems. Second, most agreed that exclusive claims of cultural ownership might lead to problematic notions of ethnic nationalism. Finally, there was general agreement that if nothing else, the heated debate over cultural property is a sign of the increased empowerment of native peoples. Brown concludes the article by addressing specific concerns raised by several commentators that are beyond the scope of this review. CLARITY: 4
Brown, Michael F. Can Culture Be Copyrighted? Current Anthropology April, 1998 Vol. 39(2):193-222. In this article, Brown addresses the current legal problems that are associated with intellectual property rights (IPRs). He then opens the discussion of cultural sensitivity, as well as legal aspects of copyright, patent, and the 1990 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA). Following this introduction, Brown proceeds to discuss the vagueness of current law with regard to IPRs. He outlines a current shift in the way that cultural information is viewed and perceived, outlining three main causes: 1) that an ethnic nation has comprehensive rights in its own cultural ideas and products 2) that said group’s relationship to these products and ideas constitute ownership, and 3) that cultural information gathered in the past is contaminated with colonialism and therefore does not meet the criteria of informed consent Because of these perceptions, Brown acknowledges the need for changes to be made regarding IPRs. He begins by outlining some of the problems. Of major significance is appropriation of knowledge by transnational corporations. Brown states that commercial interests from the developed world seek out information from unprotected indigenous groups. They then gain patent or copyright over this information and form a legal monopoly over it. Brown also highlights other problems that are not often discussed in academic literature. For example, he points out the appropriation of indigenous ritual and religion by middle class “Indian wannabees”. Also discussed is the difficulty in recognizing cultural material, since culture cannot be strictly definable by geography, membership, or any other concrete factor. He then offers different theories and options that could potentially bring solutions to the problem of IPRs. The first potential solution is to eliminate copyright altogether, allowing information to be free to all of society. However, Brown recognizes that major problems with this argument exist. His second proposed solution involves creating new legislation in order to address the recently developed legal phenomenon of IPR. In closing, Brown voices his personal support for clear guidelines regarding all intellectual property, and he urges other anthropologists to voice their objections to the patenting of plants, objects, DNA, ritual, and other indigenous property. He also looks for support from the general public, as their sympathy and support can influence the creation of new protective legislation. Comments Clevelend praises Brown for producing an insightful and stimulating critique that clears some of the confusion over the intellectual property debate. Similarly, Descola states that Brown contributes a fair and subtle treatment of a difficult topic. However, Coombe states that she is uncomfortable with democracy defined by the full access to all cultural forms, and Karlsson sees Brown as attacking Hopi and Apache peoples for keeping their practices secretive. This view is not shared with Powers, who states “Brown’s essay is a cool-headed discussion of the broad array of issues in the debate regarding intellectual property rights” (212). Response In response, Brown addresses the consensus among peers that the legal issues surrounding IPRs is problematic. He then responds to both Coombe and Karlsson. In regard to Coombe, he blatantly states that she is mistaken because he does not think that freedom of access outweighs other aspects of the intellectual property rights debate. For Karlsson he also offers a clear reply, arguing that his statements about Hopi and Apache peoples have been misconstrued. He has offered these groups as an example of people who voice a clear expression of their position in the debate. Therefore, they are an example to other indigenous people. Brown also asserts that a respect for Hopi and Apache views does not result in a total agreement with them, nor does it mean that he is against their decisions. In conclusion, Brown hopes that his article will cause people to pause and think over the IPR issue before supporting the appropriation of cultural property. CLARITY: 5
d’Errico, F., Zilhao, M.,
Baffier, D., and Pelegrin, J. Neanderthal Acculturation in This article is a critique and refutation of the idea that the bone
tools, personal ornaments, and stone tools of the Middle to early Upper
Paleolithic in The authors summarize the opposing argument by highlighting six hypotheses and conditions which must be verifiable in order for the acculturation model to be correct. These are: 1. evidence of postdepostional disturbance, 2. if products of trade of collection, no traces of in situ manufacture, 3. if products of imitation, they should be identical to the Aurignacian, 4. if learned, conceptual models should be identical to Aurignacian and discontinuous with technologies preceding contact, 5. technologies cannot have occurred before first appearance of Aurignacian in Europe and 6. evidence of extinction of Neanderthals and replacement by modern humans. They go on to dispute these conditions with evidence taken from the excavations at the archaeological site Grotto du Renne. The stratigraphy and chronology of the site revealed a sequence of archaeological layers attributed to the Mousterian, Chatelperronian, Aurignacian, and Gravettian. This data is presented in table format which shows the stratigraphic units and the corresponding lithology, carbon-14 dates, human remains, and the cultural attributation of each layer. Each hypothesis and condition of the acculturation model is evaluated in depth by examining specific technologies in question and techniques of their manufacture found at the Grotto du Renne and other sites. The first hypothesis evaluated is postdepostional disturbance which is refuted by lack of evidence of mixing between the Aurignacian and Chatelperronian layers. The second hypothesis, products of trade or collection, is refuted through evidence of waste products of bone manufacture and the matching of worked bones with by-products of their fabrication found in the Chatelperronian layer. Both the imitation and leaned hypotheses are refuted through evidence of significant differences in types of tools, raw materials, frequencies of types, and procedures of manufacture in Chatelperronian and Aurignacian layers. The chronology necessary for acculturation is also discussed with an analysis of radiocarbon dates and chronostratigraphy concluding that Chatelperronian technologies predate those of Aurignacian and are not the result of a long period of contact with modern humans. The authors also use a parallel analysis of the relationship between Iberian Neanderthals and modern humans which resulted in Neanderthals maintaining their culture rather than being acculturated despite contact with a neighboring population of Homo sapien sapiens. The authors conclude this article by moving forward from a rejection of the acculturation model to new approaches for analyzing late Neanderthal cultures. This includes re-evaluating the presumed biologically based intellectual superiority of modern humans and considerations of the use of symbols in a Neanderthal cultural system. The authors encourage these new approaches to be used in further research on this time period. Commentary is made on the above article by a number of anthropologists with varying degrees of complementary and contrasting viewpoints. Some express agreement with the authors conclusions and reconfirm the validity of their evidence. Others raise various concerns with the article including lack of evidence in the phase between Middle and Upper Paleolithic, plausibility of some cultural exchange between populations, the meaning of the term “acculturation” and its possible confusion with intellectual inferiority, dismissing of particular radiocarbon dates, the possible invalidity of comparison between Chatelperronian and Aurignacian technologies, and the stratigraphic integrity of the Grotto du Renne, among others. The authors reply by clarifying and further developing some of the issues raised by the commentators including the validity of the stratigraphy at the Grotto du Renne site, possible disturbances at other sites, the chronology of the Chatelperronian and the Aurignacian, and their interpretation of the term acculturation. They use these points of empirical evidence to re-emphasize the importance of challenging the assumed inferiority of the Neanderthals as a new perspective to be used in future investigations of this time period. CLARITY: 3
D’Errico, Francesco et al.
Neanderthal Acculturation in This article focuses on the biological and cultural interactions between Neanderthals and anatomically modern humans, as well as the reevaluation of Chatêlperronian technology using empirical analysis of stratigraphic, chronological and archaeological data. D’Errico et al. argue that recent data gathered at the Grotte du Renne site call into question archaeological traditional thought: that cultural artifacts such as bone tools and personal ornaments appearing along side “modern” stone tools during the Middle Paleolithic or Aurignacian Paleolithic periods suggested the acculturation of late Neanderthal populations. The authors consider the traditional interpretive model of independent development or imitation in their empirical systematic analysis. The traditional interpretive model of independent development asserts Neanderthals were biologically and intellectually inferior, having acquired “modern” technology through acculturation, imitation, trade, and/or collection. The following hypotheses were used in the assessment of stratigraphic, chronological and archaeological data. First, the complete replacement of Neanderthals by anatomically modern humans was responsible for the assemblage of New Lithic technology. Second, co-habitation of regions by Neanderthals and anatomically modern humans, led to the acculturation as evidenced by the assemblage of blade and stone technology, as well as personal ornamentation normally associated with Upper Paleolithic material culture. The empirical analysis of the Grotte du
Renne supports the assertion that Neanderthals did have the intellectual
capacity to manufacture
stone and bone tools and personal ornaments, thereby dismissing the
traditional school of thought. The authors’ empirical analysis
is based of the following; first, the Szeletian and the Bohunician
are similar to pre-Aurignacian technocomplexes made by Neanderthals
in Central & Eastern Europe. second, identification of bone and personal ornaments are
from similar areas and time ranges. Third, the Chatêlperronian and
Aurignacian periods will never stratigraphically overlap. Lastly, early
Aurignacian industry will never be found in Iberian regions South of
the Comments Commentators remain for the most part skeptical of the authors’ departure from traditional thinking of Neanderthals’ biological and intellectual inferiority. Many reassert the existence of outside colonization of the Neanderthal populations by anatomically modern humans. In sum, the majority of the commentators accept the Neanderthal/ anatomically modern humans transitional evolution hypothesis. Reply The authors note enthusiastically that the commentators agree with the empirical patterns presented, as well as the acceptance that artifacts located at Chatêlperronian levels are in situ and were manufactured locally. However, the authors continue to be frustrated by comments made regarding the stratigraphic data analysis which, continue to support, the hypotheses of post-depositional disturbance, imitation, trade and/or collection as the only way to account for the assemblage of artifacts. CLARITY: 3
Erlandson, Jon McVey. CA Forum on Anthropology in Public: The Making of Chumash Tradition: Replies to Haley and Wilcoxon. Current Anthropology Vol. 39(4) Aug-Oct., 1998: 477-510 Haley and Wilcoxon's article, "Anthropology and the Making of Chumash Tradition", which appeared in Current Anthropology in 1997 (Vol. 38:761-94) sparked a debate on the role that anthropologists play in determining authenticity of cultural claims. Erlandson states, "anthropologists should not act as the sole arbiters of truth and justice, the diviners of who is or is not Indian, or the creators of simplistic stereotypes that exacerbate factionalism within the Indian tribes or interfere in tribal self-determination" (CA, 39:484). King agrees, "[t]he beliefs of societies should be evaluated by the members of the societies, not by outsiders" (CA, 39:485). In this CA Forum numerous voices are heard, and it appears that all of them have some sort of criticism regarding the processes, definitions, and conclusions that Haley and Wilcoxon assert in their article. For the most part these in-depth responses are concerned with various forms of the "authentication" of myths, histories, and traditions by scholars such as anthropologists. Erlandson's main criticism was the fact that Haley and Wilcoxon seemed bent on proving that "Traditionalist" interpretations of Chumash traditions were in fact based on, and reinforced by, the interpretations of anthropologists. In their reply they deny that this was their focus, but instead insist that they set out to show the impact that anthropological work has on Native American cultures (and any culture for that matter). King on the other hand points out that Haley and Wilcoxon are not consistent in defining "Traditionalist" and "non-Traditionalist" in their article and original response. This is a problem that is pointed out by many of the authors in this article, and it is cleared up in the reply. Haley and Wilcoxon insist that they are using the terms in the way that those who are labeled prefer to be called. Ruyle notes that Haley is quoted in the Santa Barbara News-Press on December 26, 1997 as saying, "The Chumash never shared a vision of themselves as a people. The notion of a Chumash people – culture, tribe or nation – all of that is a product of anthropology." Interestingly, Haley does not clarify on this statement, and possibly has no reason to do so. In their response Haley and Wilcoxon make it clear that the best records available describe the indigenous peoples of this region as being comprised of many different, though culturally similar groups. The incorporation of the media into this debate sparked many in the Chumash community, and the Native American community at large, to harden their stance against anthropologists – regardless, Haley and Wilcoxon believe that this debate should in fact be public. The other major concern was the economic interest that Haley and Wilcoxon have in discrediting "Traditionalists" who have established a cultural resource consulting firm, which many of the authors say is in direct competition with Wilcoxon and Associates. The assertion is that since nowhere in the original article is this economic tie mentioned that it was purposefully omitted. Haley and Wilcoxon deny this claim on the grounds that there are many consultant firms and to the best of their knowledge there has never been a bid made by them against a Native American consulting group. But, it is strikingly interesting that many of the professional authors noted this omission and discrepancy. This is an interesting debate and an important topic for the discipline of anthropology. CLARITY: 4
Erlandson, Jon McVey. The Making of Chumash Tradition. Current Anthropology August-October, 1998 Vol. 39(4):477-510. This article is a response to a previous paper by Haley and Wilcoxon,
colleagues of Erlandson at the During the 1960’s and 1970’s, while all the emancipation and civil rights movements were underway, American Natives and other ethnic minorities began to declare their ethnic and cultural heritage, including the Chumash. There are only about 3000 individuals who have claimed their Chumash ancestry. Erlandson discusses the debate surrounding the authenticity of their claims. He defends himself against allegations that he was only concerned with one group of Chumash and details his involvement with other groups of Chumash besides the one in question in this particular study. Another debate in the paper is the discussion surrounding the sacredness of Point Conception, also referred to as the “Western Gate”. This is a pivotal issue because of proposed construction of gas pipelines and developments by large corporations through Chumash territory. Erlandson was involved in these negotiations on behalf of the Chumash. The Chumash believed this to be an area that was sacred to their ancestors and therefore inviolate. Another point of contention is the descent of “Family A” which is an important point in Haley and Wilcoxon’s paper. Erlandson names the family he believes they were talking about and lays waste to Haley and Wilcoxon’s allegation that this is not actually a Chumash family. Some of the discussion here becomes pointed and political with Erlandson disputing Haley and Wilcoxon’s notions that since the Chumash are really only an anthropological construct, they can have no claims to ancestral territory or sacred sites. Erlandson also analyzes the argument made by Haley and Wilcoxon that the Chumash people themselves bear little or no claim to a partnership in managing their past since they don’t really have one as a group. Erlandson states that cultural verification is not the problem here and that anthropologists must guard carefully against minimizing their role in the politics surrounding their work. He concludes by restating that the attitude portrayed by Haley and Wilcoxon is “an attempt to discredit a potentially powerful competitor for lucrative archaeology contracts” (484). Comments The comments include a response from a firm called Topanga Anthropological Consultants, apparently named in the article, taking exception with the way they are depicted. An elder from another band of California Indians (this is what she calls herself) feels that natives’ survival is again threatened as it was with colonization when questions of their ancestry arise. There are several lengthy comments from others discussing the relative merits of archaeology and its relationship to political and economic interests in the dominant culture. Reply The reply comes from Haley and Wilcoxon
and they begin by stating that their interest lies “in anthropologists’ various
roles… including… traditional-cultural-property evaluation
of CLARITY: 4
Gordon, Matthew and Jeffery Heath. Sex, Sound Symbolism, and Sociolinguistics. Current Anthropology, 1998, vol. 39 (4): 421-449. Gordon and Heath argue that, regardless of language, females and males are attracted asymmetrically to opposite poles of the vowel spectrum, females favoring the high front unrounded (i) while males prefer the back rounded (o) or (a). This hypothesis is intended to link the contemporaneous findings of sociolinguists: first, vowel systems cycle in unidirectional rotations; second, females lead linguistic changes while males trail behind. After discussing many theoretical issues about female-led vowel shifts, Gordon and Heath look to steady-state vocalic data collected from English and Arabic speakers as evidence. The argument is predicated on the research of Labov; however, the authors intend to update his and others’ variationist methodology. They believe such methodology limits the interpretation of the finding that women lead linguistic changes because it focuses ad hoc on phonetic variables after they acquire biased distribution in social space. Although theoretical models of vocal chain shifts as well as the replacement of a linear conception of class with the network strength scale by sociolinguists have been useful, Gordon and Heath hold that vowel qualities have important aesthetic values which inform (but do not limit) the sex-based differences of vowel changes and which have hitherto not been properly contextualized by variationists. To explain the female propensity for vowel changes in the direction of (i), Gordon and Heath show that certain vowels are correlated with respective symbologies. High front vowels are semantically correlated to diminutives. Furthermore, the authors rely on Ohala’s hypothesis that high front vowels commonly symbolize smallness because they are “characterized by high acoustic frequency”(quoted in Gordon and Heath, 429). Because of the sexual dimorphism of female and male anatomy, especially, related to vocal chords and the larynx, the authors suggest it is the “heart” (ibid. 430) of the phonetic differences. While there biological distinctions are formidable, the authors are careful not to jump to the conclusion that sexual dimorphism is what motivates the sex difference in language; they argue rather that cultural categories of gender and even class inform the difference as well. With the theory in place, the authors
move on to the data, first concentrating on data collected from English
speakers, the data collected from Arabic
speakers. Evidence from Labov’s The authors warn against the spurious conclusion that because most or all vowel shifts are begun by women and aim towards the high front (i), all vowels will eventually end up as (i). They produce interesting suggestions for how vowel systems maintain homeostasis. The fifth suggestion, the push-chain effect in which the fronting and raising of certain vowels instigates other vowels to compensate by backing and lowering, is considered the most. They end by referencing other anthropological studies, including Labov and Bourdieu, which complement the conclusions of the authors’ argument. Comments: Overall, the comments conditionally accept
Gordon and Heath’s
argument as put forth in the article. All of the authors in the Comments
section worry about oversimplification of the rich experience of language,
class, sex and gender, and they wish for more data to be addressed.
Niloofar Haeri eloquently expresses anxiety about over-emphasizing
physiological asymmetries to explain sex-based linguistic difference.
Rosenhouse calls for more in-depth study of the English and Arabic
data before she will accept the authors’ hypothesis. Holmes and Reply: Gordon and Heath accept that the water in which they are working may
be muddier than they let on. Still, they contend that their hypothesis
holds true and that none of the comments seriously damage it. They
agree that diphthongal and consonantal data should be explored to see
if the same or a different pattern emerges. The counter-examples that
Holmes and CLARITY: 2
Gordon, Matthew and Jeffery Heath. Sex, Sound, Symbolism, and Sociolinguistics. Current Anthropology August-October, 1998 Vol.39(4):421-449. Gordon and Heath’s article links elements of sound both to symbolism and gender. The authors focus primarily on phonemes; however, they use biology, anthropology and sociology for both explanations and peripheral support. They present information with respect to the relationship between differences in male and female vocal tract to explain both phonetic and cultural differences with respect to language change. For instance, the authors cite examples where female lead changes tend to favor [i] and palatalization in both Chinese and English. The authors then proceed to correlate the instances involving the phoneme [i] with words that connote smallness, thereby linking feminine speech to small attributes and inherently high pitch. Furthermore, the authors suggest that because of these biological differences, each sex should lead various vowel changes. For example, changes favoring front, unrounded vowels would tend to be lead by women, while back, rounded vowels would tend to be lead by men because of the innate biological differences that make such vocalization seem more natural for each sex. As such, these differences, according to Gordon and Heath, are a ubiquitous level of linguistics while culture and socialization factors merely interact with and differentiate language from this pre-established biological unity. The authors also speculate why linguistic changes are more often than not, engineered by women. Consequently, they found that women tend to lead more strenuously towards their biological tendencies than men. Furthermore, the typical sounds of both genders are thought to become associated with the stereotypes of the gender that they characterize. As a result, the sounds associated to women are seen as smaller from the biological symbolism attached to the characteristically favored sounds of men. This paper makes use of the large, influential and pioneering name of Labov at the opening of nearly all new sections, to not only introduce data and situate that data in a historical context, but also to borrow Labov’s prestige and believability. The paper begins by outlining the historical links between sound symbolism and gender, followed by outlining the process of vowel change. Soon after the concept of gender is introduced into the equation. Next, the authors attempt to link the concept of sound symbolism to gender and to the process of linguistic change as a whole. As supporting evidence, Gordon and Heath draw examples from both English and Arabic, two distinctly unrelated languages, to illustrate the universality of these biologically driven linguistic changes. Comments It seems that many of the commentators do not wholly agree with the authors. For instance, one critic raises examples involving female lead changes that illustrate the reverse of what Gordon and Heath predicted, such as schwa lowering in some dialects of Norwegian. Most critics agree, however, that the paper offers an interesting perspective, which requires further substantiating evidence. Conversely, other critics argue that the authors omitted far too much detail by not sufficiently focusing their research objectives. Reply Gordon and Heath on the other hand do not agree with the majority of their critics. Indeed, they defend their position by pointing out that with an integrated paper it is extremely difficult to cover all of the relevant information. However, they agree with some critics who indicated that it is important to study the relationships not only for vowels, but also for diphthongs and consonants. CLARITY: 2
Harke, Heinrich. Archaeologists and Migrations-A Problem of Attitude. Current Anthropology February, 1998 Vol.39(1) 19-45 “Archaeologists and Migrations –A Problem of Attitudes”,
discusses the relationship between cultural agents, in this case nationality
and history, and the interpretation of archaeology. Heinrich Harke,
a German educated in both The British reaction was skeptical of a claim of such high numbers
of immigrants while the Germans conversely could not believe that so
many native British existed at that time. Harke argues that these opposing
viewpoints, derived from the exact same evidence, show that the social
context and historical experience of groups; the Germans and the British,
have a large, determining influence on archaeological knowledge. The
British, he says, tend to have a more insular and self-contained view
of cultural change. He points to contemporary and historical factors;
lack of recent invasions, closer intellectual ties to the The Germans attitude is explained by Harke through German ideas surrounding ethnicity. Ethnicity is tied to descent and not location or territoriality, so this in effect, “makes it easier to imagine the movement of large, homogenous “folk” groups and the transfer of their ethnic identity from one area to the next”(pg 21). Harke goes on to make connections between the social context and archaeological
theory of Nazi Germany and the Comments There are numerous critiques of this article and number
of different issues are raised but many of them seem to stem
from the idea that Harke’s analysis is oversimplified. Particularly,
the idea that archaeologist are controlled by the dominant views
within the social context in which they are working is challenged.
As Maria Isabel Martinez Navarette criticizes, “Archaeologists
are not so enslaved to the contexts in which they work. Complex,
multifaceted phenomena are here treated generically and unidimensionally
as monolithic, homogenous entities.”(pg. 34) Nandini Rao offers
another critique; that Harkes analysis is well known and already
readily accepted. His concern is that in using the politically extreme
examples of the Response Harke responds to the criticism that his arguments are oversimplified and superficial by acknowledging that this is indeed the case. He contends that a paper like the one that he has written necessarily has to generalize and oversimplify. “I maintain that some generalization must be allowed if we are to avoid being stuck forever in the minutiae of individual cases”(pg. 41) CLARITY: 2 BOONE W.
Härke, Heinrich. Archaeologists and Migrations: A Problem of Attitude. Current Anthropology February, 1998 Vol.39(1):19-45. Härke addresses the attitudes of British and German archaeologists and the question of migrations. He suggests that these attitudes have been shaped by political and social experiences, as well as by the respective historical and geographical contexts of the two countries. The author believes that British perceptions of migration have shifted from traditionalist to processualist to post-processualist, and adds insularity to the list of causal factors. He states that this insular outlook may have been reinforced by the steady decline in the knowledge of foreign languages among the younger British archaeologists. According to Härke, German archaeology
is still dominated by a strong migrationist undercurrent. Since 1945,
the retreat of German archaeologists
has had consequences on the nature of interpretation with the rejection
of early carbon dating dates for European prehistory that reinforced
diffusionist tendencies. Cases of migrationism of Nazi Germany and The author’s concern on the migration issue is discussed with an example of the question of the origin of the buried male found in an early Anglo-Saxon cemetery. He states that the result has brought different reactions from the British and German. Härke presents his argument with three cases that are effective for his claim. The article concludes with the expectation of migration studies be put back on the agenda in archaeology. The issue of migration and the author’s concern with attitudes in archaeology regarding this issue are well defined by this article. Comments The commentators were favorable except for the two following. One academic believes that Härke’s focus on the biases of the researchers removed the principal evidence for the study and that this fostered biases that lead to overemphasis. This same commentator declares that Härke provided post-processual equivalents of “Mickey Mouse laws” and states that this article is evidence of the “publish or perish” imperative of British academe. Another academic finds the evidence is harder to find that proves the connection between attitudes and national origins. This commentator also finds Härke’s attitude is ambiguous regarding reality. Reply In his reply, Härke admits that the commentators have greatly expanded on his observations. He does clarify some misunderstandings and returns to the subject of his paper. The author explains and defends the “simplistic” nature of his arguments. Härke states that this article is an exploratory paper and only offers tentative partial explanations of complex phenomena. He also explains his choices of cases as clear-cut examples since they are extreme. Härke accepts several commentators’ well-informed points and believes that there is a need for further thought on and improvement of our concepts of migrations and our methods of studying them. CLARITY: 4
Hirth, Kenneth. The Distributional Approach: A New Way to Identify Marketplace Exchange in the Archaeological Record. Current Anthropology Aug.-Oct.,1998 Vol. 39(4):451-476. Kenneth Hirth describes the Distributional Approach as a new way to
identify marketplace exchange in pre-Hispanic society. It is evident
that the marketplace was a central feature to economics in the Mesoamerican
region. Evidence is present; proving the importance of the marketplace
in ancient It is important to understand marketplace exchange in order to fully grasp how and why economical, political, and social systems developed as they did. Developing the Distributional Approach into something that is a useful tool for Archaeologist would be beneficial in discovering these things. Hirth focuses on household inventories to explain marketplace exchange. He uses the site at Xochicalco to form his hypothesis. This site has been preserved very well, permitting it to be used and examined by archaeologists who wish to identify these types of things. Thus, it makes it an excellent site on which to use this approach. Comments: Many professionals included comments on the article that differed from each other and from Hirth. Many commented that his proposal was interesting but not the only answer. Hirth seems to agree. Hirth’s analysis is only the beginning, it needs more work, and to be used in corroboration with other methods. Carraso made a comment that it would be beneficial to test the hypothesis in a living society. Overall the commentators agree with what Creamer had to say, “This article pushes archaeology a step closer to understanding ancient exchange.” Reply: Hirth surprisingly takes all the comments
into consideration. While he addresses each commentator’s line of reasoning he sticks to
his own guns. He splits the discussion into three general parts: “the
theoretical value of the distributional approach, the operational limitations
facing its application in other areas of CLARITY: 4
Hirth, Kenneth G. The Distributional Approach: A New Way to Identify Marketplace Exchange in the Archaeological Record. Current Anthropology August-October 1998 Vol. 39(4):451-476. Hirth first explains how centrally important marketplaces were in The author elaborates on the difficulties of identifying marketplaces in the archaeological record. He also suggests that there is a dearth of appropriate methods and analytical models of study to accomplish finding ancient marketplaces. The article summarizes the problems with the three methods used in the past, and profiles his new approach. First, the configurational approach is not effective because marketplaces leave few material traces and this method relies on spatial and architectural evidence. Second, the contextual approach can only infer the existence of marketplace exchange but cannot study them directly. This is accomplished mainly through evidence of craft specialists such as obsidian craftsmen and the detritus of their work. Third, the spatial approach looks at distribution of manufactured items over large areas as evidence of development of a regional market system. These three approaches are indirect methods of studying market exchange. Hirth’s approach is more direct and is named the distributional approach which studies distribution of commodities among primary consumers. Economic activity of households as producer-vendors provide the most effective means of studying market exchange from material remains. Household archaeology |
.jpg){kind=small}
.gif){kind=small}
.gif){kind=small}